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Abstract
The 2013–2016 epidemic of Ebola virus disease (EVD) that originated in West Africa underscored 
many of the challenges to conducting clinical research during an ongoing infectious disease 
epidemic, both in the most affected countries of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, as well as in 
the United States and Europe, where a total of 27 patients with EVD received care in 
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biocontainment units. The Special Pathogens Research Network (SPRN) was established in the 
United States in November 2016 to provide an organizational structure to leverage the expertise of 
the 10 Regional Ebola and Other Special Pathogen Treatment Centers (RESPTCs); it was intended 
to develop and support infrastructure to improve readiness to conduct clinical research in the 
United States. The network enables the rapid activation and coordination of clinical research in the 
event of an epidemic and facilitates opportunities for multicenter research when the RESPTCs are 
actively caring for patients requiring a biocontainment unit. Here we provide an overview of 
opportunities identified in the clinical research infrastructure during the West Africa EVD 
epidemic and the SPRN activities to meet the ongoing challenges in the context of Ebola virus and 
other special pathogens.
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Ebola virus disease; Special pathogens; Clinical research; Investigational therapeutics
MORE THAN 2 DOZEN Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemics have been identified since 
EVD was first recognized in 1976.1 Several investigational medical countermeasures 
(MCMs) for EVD have been used clinically, including direct-acting antivirals, vaccines, 
immune plasma, and monoclonal antibodies.2–4 Implementation of sufficiently powered 
randomized controlled studies to evaluate these potential MCMs has been constrained by the 
limited infrastructure in epidemic locations available to support clinical research, the 
sporadic and often self-limited nature of EVD outbreaks, and the risk of virus transmission 
to personnel conducting the research. As a result, the development of these investigational 
products has been relegated to preclinical (in vitro and animal model) studies that have, for 
the most part, stopped short of substantive human investigation.5 Even the putative role of 
convalescent plasma, the limited use of which has been described in previous outbreaks, has 
suffered from limitations in study design and a general lack of standardization of antibody 
titers in the administered products.6–8
The lack of coordinated clinical research protocols during EVD outbreaks led to the use of a 
wide variety of investigational MCMs, instead of a few that could be well studied. These 
varied MCMs were all given instead under compassionate use for EVD patients cared for in 
the United States and Europe during the 2013–2016 epidemic.2 These included convalescent 
plasma and whole blood; monoclonal antibodies, including ZMapp (MappBio, San Diego, 
CA), MIL77 (Mabworks, China), and ZMab (Defyrus, Canada, and Public Health Agency of 
Canada); direct-acting antivirals such as brincidofovir (Chimerix, Durham, NC), favipiravir 
(Fuji/Toyama, Japan), TKM-Ebola (Tekmira Pharmaceuticals, Canada); supportive 
therapies, such as FX06 (MChE-F4Pharma, Vienna, Austria), amiodarone, melanocortin, 
and various immunomodulators, such as the type I interferons with or without ribavirin; and 
the live attenuated viral vaccine rVSV-ZEBOV (Merck, Kenilworth, NJ).2
Clinicians seeking access to investigational MCMs for their EVD patients were faced with 
limited data on the few available products, relying mainly on anecdotal reports or animal 
response data to help guide treatment decisions for individual patients. Due in part to the 
urgency to begin administration of investigational MCMs as soon as possible, as well as the 
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lack of a coordinated research network, efforts were undertaken simultaneously at multiple 
centers without standardized methods for clinical data collection and specimen collection 
and storage across institutions. Since most EVD patients cared for in the United States and 
Europe received multiple investigational therapeutics on an uncontrolled basis, inferences 
about safety and clinical benefit of specific agents were very limited. This resulted in few 
opportunities to develop coordinated high-quality clinical trials and advance scientific 
knowledge about optimal EVD therapeutic regimens.9 By the end of the epidemic, only 1 
patient with EVD who had been cared for in the United States or Europe was enrolled in a 
randomized controlled trial during the epidemic.10
In the future, a coordinating body with representation from each of the affected countries 
would be ideal to determine future protocols and assist in prioritization of these studies. In 
the current outbreak of EVD, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases 
(NIAID) has taken the lead in working with agencies for prioritization of MCMs included in 
the 4-arm trial.11
The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), and NIAID, in collaboration with the National Academies 
of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, completed a comprehensive evaluation of clinical 
research conducted during the 2013–2016 epidemic. While the report focused on the EVD 
research efforts in West Africa, many of the lessons learned are also relevant for other 
resource-limited countries, including the importance of incorporating research as a core 
component of epidemic response and the cost-effectiveness of capacity building.12 Funded 
by ASPR and coordinated by the National Ebola Training and Education Center (NETEC), 
the Special Pathogens Research Network (SPRN) was created in the United States in 2016 to 
provide an organizational structure to leverage the expertise of the 10 Regional Ebola and 
Other Special Pathogen Treatment Centers (RESPTCs) to develop and support infrastructure 
in the United States to improve readiness to conduct clinical research during a public health 
emergency.13
In this article, we provide an overview of opportunities identified in the clinical research 
infrastructure during the EVD epidemic, the resulting structure of the SPRN, the activities in 
the workgroups, and the implementation of an expanded access protocol across the SPRN. 
Ongoing challenges and opportunities in clinical research are reviewed in the context of 
Ebola virus and other emerging pathogens.
CLINICAL RESEARCH IN THE EVD EPIDEMIC
In the United States, access to investigational products during the EVD epidemic occurred 
via uncontrolled single-patient-use Emergency Investigational New Drug (EIND) 
authorization from the FDA.14 Many of these investigational products did not have existing 
clinical protocols for humans and had limited data available on pharmacokinetics, optimal 
dosing, and safety in humans. Thus, in many cases, investigational protocols had to be 
developed by local clinical investigators or the product sponsors in parallel with the EIND 
process for individual local institutional review board (IRB) approval.
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Development of protocols was influenced by uncertainties in the international research 
community regarding the ethical acceptability of withholding treatments with inadequate 
prior testing in humans, the ethics of conducting research on a disease with a high case 
fatality proportion during an emergency, and the optimal study design for assessing 
countermeasures in a setting in which randomized, placebo-controlled trials (the gold 
standard of medical research) were not always feasible.15 The few facilities in the United 
States with established biocontainment units had to quickly implement new protocols in 
coordination with their clinical research infrastructure and biocontainment unit clinical staff 
in the midst of patient care.16 Furthermore, optimal supportive clinical management of EVD 
patients was not well-defined prior to the 2013–2016 epidemic. The case fatality proportion 
of 18.5% for the 27 patients with EVD managed in biocontainment units in the United States 
and Europe was substantially lower than that for patients managed in West African Ebola 
treatment units, suggesting that intensive care management of patients with other etiologies 
of critical illness may be beneficial for patients with EVD. However, many unanswered 
questions remain about the optimal supportive clinical management of patients with EVD, 
and ensuring access to investigational MCMs across multiple clinical sites remains a 
challenge.17
Despite a lack of preparation for the conduct of clinical research specific to biocontainment 
units and preexisting coordination of research efforts, organizations and individuals obtained 
and administered investigational products on an emergency basis for the 11 EVD patients 
cared for at medical centers in the United States. Although patients did not receive similar 
MCMs under a common protocol, clinical data were shared in weekly international clinical 
calls to help inform care of new EVD patients and were subsequently published in the 
medical literature.2 This was made possible through both federal and local efforts, as well as 
private industry participation. Federal agencies, including the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), the FDA, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development 
Authority (BARDA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and NIAID, coordinated 
information sharing regarding medical countermeasures and compassionate use, while the 
FDA provided timely review of EINDs and connected institutions to pharmaceutical 
companies.
At each institution, emergent implementation of the clinical research occurred: local IRBs 
met ad hoc to accommodate needs, sponsored programs offices rapidly executed 
confidentiality disclosure agreements and contracts, research pharmacists developed 
protocols and procedures for product preparation, staff were trained in product 
administration and safety monitoring, and case report forms were developed. These efforts 
were replicated for each MCM at each institution. Biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies shared available data on current investigational MCMs, most of which were not 
publicly available at the time, and worked closely with federal and local partners to expedite 
the process.18
As the epidemic continued, attempts to increase coordination across the biocontainment 
units grew, leading to multiple federal, academic, and industry partners coming together to 
discuss potential investigational therapies, clinical care options, and collaborative 
approaches. Despite these efforts, opportunities for improvement in both process efficiency 
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and research outcomes were evident. The epidemic, however, was on the decline well before 
controlled trials were launched, limiting the ability to conduct effective and robust clinical 
trials in the already challenging context of an international infectious disease emergency 
(Figure 1).
ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF THE SPRN
In an effort to better prepare the United States to respond efficiently and effectively to future 
epidemics, NETEC was created to increase the capability of US public health and healthcare 
systems to safely and effectively manage individuals infected with suspected and confirmed 
special pathogens13 (Table 1). When launched in 2015, NETEC was charged with several 
core responsibilities, including readiness assessment and metric development, education, 
training, and provision of technical assistance to increase the competency of healthcare and 
public health workers and the capability of healthcare facilities to deliver safe, efficient, and 
effective care to patients infected with EVD or other special pathogens. In 2016, NETEC’s 
charge was expanded to include developing infrastructure to support clinical research 
readiness for future epidemics; the SPRN is composed of the 10 RESPTCs (Figure 2), which 
are also the institutions that are responsible for providing clinical care in their HHS region.
The SPRN is developing infrastructure through which research can be incorporated into the 
care of patients at the RESPTCs, with a focus on network engagement, infrastructure 
readiness, and training readiness. With resources and expertise distributed regionally through 
these 10 centers, the goal of the network is to markedly improve clinical research readiness 
for EVD and other special pathogens in the United States.
The SPRN has maintained a close collaboration with federal and other external partners as 
an extension of the relationships developed during the 2013–2016 EVD epidemic. To 
facilitate this, the SPRN formed a partner working group with the goal of continuing those 
collaborations to support better coordination of investigational MCMs. The partner working 
group, in addition to NETEC membership, includes BARDA, CDC, the FDA, NIAID, the 
DOD’s Infectious Disease Clinical Research Program (IDCRP), and the US Army Medical 
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). CDC, the FDA, BARDA, the 
Department of Defense, and NIAID provide expertise for the selection of appropriate 
MCMs, as well as for the progression of MCMs through the research and regulatory 
pipelines.
Given that individuals admitted to biocontainment units may be infected with Ebola virus or 
other special pathogens for which there are no licensed treatments, standards of care, or 
prophylactic options for close contacts or exposed individuals, the MCM working group has 
focused on assessing the evolving landscape of investigational counter-measures. The goal 
of the MCM working group is to develop guidance on pathogen-specific therapeutics or 
prophylaxis measures based on the available supporting scientific evidence and to catalogue 
the supporting scientific evidence. To acquire this supporting scientific evidence, the MCM 
working group is assessing existing literature and unpublished findings from federal, 
academic, and industry partners while organizing the results in reviews that will be designed 
to provide operational guidance to clinicians during epidemics in any global setting. These 
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include EVD as well as other special pathogens that would utilize investigational MCMs as 
the primary therapeutic. During the 2013–2016 EVD epidemic, there was a paucity of 
resources available about potential therapeutics. By contrast, specifically for the current 
2018 outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the MCM working group has 
compiled a status report of investigational MCMs for EVD that were distributed to the 
NETEC leaders (Table 2). These documents can serve as a template for future MCM 
summaries for other special pathogens and will be updated routinely as new therapeutics 
emerge.
The primary deliverable is to document potential MCMs for priority pathogens to inform 
SPRN research goals; the documents will be available on the main NETEC website.25 To 
avoid duplication of effort, the group will liaise with existing groups conducting similar 
reviews. Public access to these documents will serve 2 purposes: first, they will be a rapidly 
accessible resource for clinicians involved in the care of people known or suspected to be 
infected with special pathogens, whether associated with an established RESPTC or not; 
second, they will be available for researchers to review, which may stimulate ideas for novel 
or complimentary MCMs.
SPRN ACTIVITIES
Nine deliverables were created in the SPRN contract in order to benchmark progress in the 
creation of a network that can support special pathogen research (Table 3). These activities 
also meet several of the goals and objectives outlined in the 2018 National Biodefense 
Strategy.26 They are described below under 3 broad headings of network engagement, 
infrastructure readiness, and training readiness.
Network Engagement
All 10 RESPTCs are represented in the SPRN, in collaboration with federal partners. The 
SPRN has frequent opportunities to accomplish the deliverables, including annual meetings, 
quarterly calls with the entire SPRN group, and weekly calls for the working group 
members. Proposals for research studies can be submitted for review to determine whether 
SPRN members would opt in to participate in a given study.
Infrastructure Readiness
Beginning with the admission of the first patient with EVD, the University of Nebraska 
Medical Center employed a rapid response IRB that allowed for review of clinical protocols 
on an expedited timeline, through extensive pre-review of protocols/consents in an iterative 
process and in close collaboration with the investigators. This was used successfully during 
the outbreak to review research protocols associated with several investigational drugs and 
interventions targeting patients with EVD who were hospitalized in the Nebraska 
Biocontainment Unit at UNMC/Nebraska Medicine. The SPRN central IRB has capitalized 
on this rapid response model with preexisting signed reliance agreements. These are signed 
by 2 or more institutions engaged in human subjects research and permit 1 or more 
institutions to cede review to another IRB, between the other RESPTCs and the UNMC 
central IRB, and serve to expedite approval of research protocols in emergency situations. 
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Other partners could potentially be brought into the network, as needed, during an epidemic 
using additional reliance agreements. For example, the SPRN sites currently work with 
Mapp Biopharmaceutical, Inc. (San Diego, CA) to make ZMapp™ available under an 
emergency use authorization (EUA) in the event that a patient with EVD is admitted to any 
of the RESPTCs.
Since there are limited clinical data for humans and many of the MCMs likely to be used in 
epidemics are in the early developmental stages, human subject protections are critically 
important when addressing research with EVD and other special pathogens. The SPRN 
central IRB is acutely aware of special considerations affecting patients hospitalized in 
biocontainment units and the constraints of conducting research in this unique setting. 
Obtaining valid informed consent is particularly challenging in the context of serious 
medical illness; the accompanying fear of death and the lack of approved or alternative 
treatment options enhance the susceptibility of this vulnerable population to undue 
inducement and therapeutic misconception. Obtaining informed consent may be particularly 
difficult if the patient has been transported long distances on an emergency basis, is 
cognitively impaired, or has few or no family members immediately present to give proxy 
consent. Even under optimal conditions, additional issues related to risk and benefit, 
innovative study design, subject privacy, and evolving regulations present challenges for 
IRBs. The use of a central IRB with experience working through these complexities 
facilitates the dual goals of conducting ethically compliant research and advancing science.
One of the challenges during the 2013–2016 EVD epidemic was the lack of a standardized 
protocol to guide the administration of MCMs and prospectively collect clinical data during 
the course of a patient’s illness. Often, since investigational MCMs had never been 
administered to a human or had only Phase 1 study data, each sponsor company created a 
treatment dosage in the EIND process with the FDA.
The SPRN protocol workgroup is taking on the development of a master clinical observation 
protocol that is similar to existing protocols, with the objective being simply to collect and 
document clinical data in a standardized fashion. This protocol can then be amended to 
include use of an investigational MCM, all working through the central IRB as described 
above. Once the master protocol to study special pathogens is written, standardized case 
report forms with an electronic platform for data collection will be developed. The goal is to 
standardize the clinical data that are collected at all SPRN institutions, thus allowing data 
analysis in aggregate. This information will also be available to other institutions if they sign 
a reliance agreement for the central IRB. Depending on the epidemic scenario, these data 
may be shared in real time with the affected regions, as was done during the 2013–2016 
EVD epidemic.
The ability to collect and store the clinical specimens obtained from patients cared for within 
the network will provide a significant resource for understanding disease pathogenesis and 
optimal patient management. Therefore, the SPRN established the biorepository working 
group to engage with potential partners to develop and maintain a network biorepository. 
Establishing this capability is challenging given the limited number of facilities that are 
approved for housing and shipping select agents, especially those requiring biosafety level 4 
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containment.27 The biorepository working group continues to develop standard operating 
procedures for processing and storing specimens from these patients. In addition, the 
biorepository working group has created a governance structure responsible for prioritizing 
specimen use by potential collaborators. This was established to ensure a fair, transparent, 
and safe process for providing access to valuable and likely limited specimens in a way that 
acknowledges issues of intellectual property rights and resource ownership while 
encouraging the sharing of resources to optimize research that will have an impact.
Training Readiness
One of the major roles of the SPRN is to ensure that sites have the necessary personnel and 
skills to administer investigational therapeutics safely and collect data appropriately. Some 
processes required for conducting research in high-containment environments differ from 
standard clinical research. Lessons learned from the 2013–2016 EVD epidemic, combined 
with experienced research teams and exercises, have informed SPRN research training 
recommendations and tools. Challenges identified among the RESPTCs have included 
research staff who may not (or cannot) have previously been trained in the use of high-level 
personal protective equipment (PPE) or, conversely, biocontainment unit clinical staff 
competent in PPE use who have not been trained in the use of investigational therapeutics or 
the requirements of research data collection. RESPTCs have different approaches to staffing, 
with some electing to train research staff to work in the biocontainment unit and others 
training clinical staff from the biocontainment unit to conduct clinical research, or a 
combination of both. For sites that need training in the proper use of PPE or research data 
collection, these resources will be available on the NETEC website.
The SPRN has developed biocontainment unit standard operating procedures to address 
staffing models and requirements, risk mitigation, informed consent, data collection and 
documentation, use of investigational therapeutics, handling and local storage of specimens, 
specimen processing and transport, and activation of the central IRB. These standard 
operating procedures are available to RESPTCs but do not supersede local policies or 
procedures, which must comply with all relevant regulations.
The SPRN couples testing and assessment of research readiness with field exercises for 
special pathogens research.28 Exercises serve as a cornerstone of the all-hazards approach to 
preparedness, including for infectious diseases, and are incorporated into local, regional, and 
national drills. The concept of integrating special pathogens research in the field has not 
been implemented widely, and much of this insight comes from the experience gained 
during the 2013–2016 EVD epidemic, including care in resource-rich settings. Annual 
NETEC site consultations to RESPTC facilities have recently incorporated clinical care 
exercises during the visits, with options to include activation of the research infrastructure 
needed to support a scientific evaluation of prophylactic and containment measures, 
diagnostics, and therapeutics related to Ebola virus and other special pathogens. This has 
also been drilled in a national exercise funded by HHS, in which implementation of the 
research protocol for ZMapp™ was included in the field exercise. The complexities of 
research are well suited to these exercises; the logistics of implementing a new protocol can 
be vetted during these activities.
Kraft et al. Page 9
Health Secur. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2020 February 19.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
CONCLUSION
The 2013–2016 EVD epidemic provided the first collective experience of managing and 
using investigational therapeutics for patients with EVD in biocontainment units in the 
United States. Beyond advancing knowledge and practice in the safe delivery of effective 
care, the biocontainment units that cared for patients with EVD and the many partners 
engaged in enabling delivery of investigational products to patients learned valuable lessons. 
The SPRN is leveraging those lessons and partnerships formed to expand and sustain 
engagement across the 10 RESPTCs and external partners, to develop research infrastructure 
for biocontainment units and to establish training readiness to optimize opportunities for 
clinical research in biocontainment units in the future for national infectious disease 
priorities.
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Figure 1. 
Timeline of Implementation of MCM During 2013–2016 EVD Outbreak
Reprinted with permission from Integrating Clinical Research into Epidemic Response: The 
Ebola Experience, 2017, from the National Academy of Sciences, courtesy of National 
Academies Press, Washington, DC.
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Figure 2. 
The map depicts the 10 Regional Ebola and Other Special Pathogens Treatment Center 
(RESPTCs).
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 d
at
a 
ca
pt
ur
e 
to
ol
 a
nd
 d
at
ab
as
e 
w
ith
 th
e 
ca
pa
bi
lit
y 
of
 c
ol
le
ct
in
g 
an
d 
co
or
di
na
tin
g 
da
ta
 fr
om
 th
e 
re
se
ar
ch
 n
et
w
o
rk
 a
nd
 c
on
du
ct
in
g 
ra
pi
d 
an
al
ys
es
 
to
 p
ro
v
id
e 
fe
ed
ba
ck
 th
at
 in
fo
rm
s t
he
ra
pe
ut
ic
s a
nd
 c
lin
ic
al
 m
an
ag
em
en
t.
•
 In
 c
ol
la
bo
ra
tio
n 
w
ith
 A
SP
R 
an
d 
CD
C,
 c
re
at
e 
po
lic
ie
s a
nd
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s f
or
 a
 b
io
re
po
sit
or
y 
fo
cu
se
d 
on
 sp
ec
ia
l p
at
ho
ge
ns
.
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 re
ad
in
es
s
•
 D
ev
el
op
 a
nd
 im
pl
em
en
t a
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 p
ro
to
co
l f
or
 re
se
ar
ch
 st
af
f a
t r
eg
io
na
l t
re
at
m
en
t c
en
te
rs
, e
m
ph
as
iz
in
g 
sp
ec
ia
l i
ss
ue
s p
er
ta
in
in
g 
to
 e
m
er
gi
ng
 p
at
ho
ge
ns
.
•
 D
ev
el
op
 m
od
el
 u
ni
fo
rm
 p
ol
ic
ie
s a
nd
 p
ro
ce
du
re
s f
or
 th
e 
co
nd
uc
t o
f c
lin
ic
al
 re
se
ar
ch
 in
 b
io
co
nt
ai
nm
en
t u
ni
ts.
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